Pragmatism’s Democratic Ideal by Ryder, John
Pragmatism’s Democratic Ideal 
 
John Ryder 
The State University of New York 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is often difficult to speak about the moral aspects of pragmatism, and even more 
difficult to speak about its religious dimension. Pragmatist morality or pragmatist ethics 
often has a ring of opportunism, in that it can easily suggest to people an ethics or 
morality without principle. If one is a pragmatist, according to this idea, one is inclined or 
at least willing to respond to each situation in whichever way is most advantageous, 
regardless of what duty, obligation or principle require. If this is the sense one has of 
pragmatist morality, then it is easy to understand how a pragmatist religious sensibility 
might appear incomprehensible. One significant aspect of the religious life is that one 
subordinates oneself to or subsumes oneself in the divine. But if one’s sense of moral 
duty is practically oriented, or opportunist, as some critics would have it, then religious 
subordination or subsumtion makes little sense. For these reasons pragmatism has seemed 
to many people at best too thin as a working foundation for one’s life, and at worst 
distinctly perverse. 
 The situation is made even trickier when we introduce naturalism into the 
equation. Not all pragmatists have been naturalists. James, I would argue, was not, nor I 
think was Peirce. Royce, to the extent that he thought pragmatically, was certainly not a 
naturalist. But by the latter half of the 20th century the most influential strain of 
pragmatism, stemming from John Dewey, was overtly naturalistic. Many philosophers 
believe that a naturalistic ethics, whether pragmatist or not, is impossible, being 
committed in the end to deriving “ought” from “is.” 
Similarly, there is something on the face of it strange about a naturalistic religion. 
Naturalism by definition excludes from reality the supernatural, in the strict sense of 
something outside nature. Therefore, if there is any sense to be given to the notion of God 
or the divine within a naturalist framework, it must be something that is itself wholly 
natural. Spinoza accomplished this by equating God and nature. Some American 
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naturalists of the 20th century, and I have in mind George Santayana, John Herman 
Randall, Jr., Justus Buchler and, more recently Robert S. Corrington, have handled the 
concept of God in various ways, in some cases abandoning it altogether, though 
following Spinoza they maintain a sense of what we can reasonably call “natural piety.” 
The most well known attempt within the pragmatic naturalist framework to address the 
notion of God or the divine is John Dewey’s A Common Faith, in which, rather like 
Feuerbach, God is reinterpreted as a symbol or ideal expression of the fulfillment of our 
highest ideals – love, knowledge, truth, justice, power and, ultimately, redemption. 
Dewey’s redefinition of God, however, has failed to satisfy many people who have a 
feeling for the religious. It does not capture, we might say, the sense of being part of a 
greater whole which is itself the source of meaning and value, and it does not capture 
what Freud described in Civilization and its Discontents as the “oceanic feeling” that is 
reported by many people as a form of religious experience. 
So there are many people who have serious misgivings about the capacity of 
pragmatism, or more specifically pragmatic naturalism, to achieve a satisfying ethics or 
philosophical theology. How can we respond to this kind of criticism of pragmatism? 
First, at least some of these criticisms are based on misunderstandings. Pragmatism is not 
opportunism, as even a cursory glance at the many pragmatist philosophical works will 
indicate. It is not a morality without principles. Rather, it is an effort to derive moral 
principles and determine ethical behavior in a way that is grounded in human experience, 
and that identifies its goals and methods in a way that stays close to what we actually do, 
what we actually want, and what we actually profess to be our working ideals. Ethical 
ideas and principles, and the actions based on them, are as much “working hypotheses” 
and “experiments” as are any other ideas and actions. 
Second, it is difficult to say much about what may or may not be satisfying to 
people, if only because there are so many factors, psychological as well as philosophical, 
that contribute to one’s sense of satisfaction with any particular conceptual framework. In 
other words, the fact that people may find pragmatism unsatisfying with respect to ethics 
or religion may imply very little about the potential philosophical strengths of 
pragmatism’s contributions in these areas. 
 3
Third, and ultimately this is the more important point, many of the critics of 
pragmatism miss or simply do not accept the most fundamental characteristic of 
pragmatism as a philosophical perspective. Pragmatism is not one more way to provide 
an overarching philosophical or theological description of how things are, or of the way 
the world works. This is what Dewey meant when he said in 1917 that philosophy 
becomes useful when it no longer tries to solve the problems of philosophers, but 
becomes instead an attempt to provide intellectual guidance in the solution of the 
problems of men.1 It is, rather, a way of moving through the world, a way of living, that 
would have us approach all problems, including the ethical and religious, with an eye 
toward the development of working solutions. With this point in mind, morality in a 
pragmatist context is a matter of addressing moral problems, individually or socially, by 
bringing to bear the general traits of the pragmatist point of view: reliance on experience, 
experimentalism, fallibilism, and a consistency of means and ends. The same applies to 
religion and theology. If there is a sensible and workable pragmatist approach to religion, 
it must, if it is to be pragmatist in fact and not just in name, follow on the same basic 
traits. How satisfying either ethics or religion of this sort might be is something that can 
not be determined theoretically. There is no doubt, though, that pragmatism is capable of 
providing satisfying, and satisfactory, ethical and religious perspectives, which we know 
simply because there are so many people who have come to see the wisdom of the 
pragmatist point of view. 
 
The Democratic Ideal 
 
I would like to devote the heart of these remarks to the issue of values within a social 
context. Specifically, my interest is in thinking about the implications of underlying 
pragmatist principles for the development of social and international relations. 
 As anyone who thinks about questions in social and political philosophy is aware, 
one of the more sustained debates in recent decades has been between liberalism and 
communitarianism. It is fair to say that both have important contributions to make, and 
that both have built-in disadvantages. Liberalism contributes its long standing emphasis 
on the moral, social and political importance of the individual, of individual rights, and of 
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individual freedom. Critics, however, tend to feel that liberalism too easily and often over 
emphasizes the individual, thereby theoretically pulling him out of social and historical 
context and distorting his nature. In the process our understanding of rights and freedom 
is similarly distorted. 
 For its part communitarianism has the advantage of focusing on the fuller social 
and historical contexts in which we all live, and in so doing provides a rich sense of 
human individuality and of the relevant issues of freedom and rights. The difficulty with 
communitarianism stems from the shortcoming of communities themselves. While 
community is often the source of individuals’ self-identification, as well as a source of 
value, meaning, and comfort, community is, or too easily can be, inward looking to a 
fault. It is too easy for many people to make the assumption that other communities and 
the individuals in them are in some way flawed or inferior. In its (usually but not 
necessarily) innocent forms this sense of the superiority of one’s own community gives 
rise to rivalries of localities in sports and other pastimes. In its virulent forms it gives rise 
to nationalism, xenophobia, racism, fascism and other violent expressions of a sense of 
one’s own community’s superiority. 
 Pragmatism, or so I shall argue, cuts across the debate between liberalism and 
communitarianism, and in the end points to a cosmopolitanism that has a good deal to 
contribute to contemporary social and political issues. The principles I would emphasize 
come from John Dewey’s Democracy and Education, published in 1916. In that book, 
specifically in Chapter 7, Dewey offers a definition of democracy. In a wonderful 
example of the pragmatist method of conceptual development, Dewey derives a 
description of democracy’s most fundamental traits by examining the characteristics of 
any community or group of people. “We cannot,” he says, “set up, out of our heads, 
something we regard as an ideal society. We must base our conception upon societies 
which actually exist…” However, he quickly points out that in constructing an ideal, it is 
not enough simply to describe what exists because that will only tell us what is, not what 
is worth striving for. “The problem,” he points out, “is to extract the desirable traits of 
forms of community life which actually exist, and employ them to criticize undesirable 
features and suggest improvements.” 
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 With that method in mind, Dewey points to two characteristics that appear in “any 
social group whatever, even in a gang of thieves…” The first of them is that within any 
social group there is some interest held in common, as well as “a certain amount of 
interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we 
derive our standard,” he says. Through a process of conceptual development that we shall 
skip over for the sake of efficiency, Dewey argues that a healthy community is one that 
fosters a proliferation of interests held in common, and that promotes ever expanding and 
freer communication and interaction among groups or communities. A society 
characterized by these two traits is the ideal toward which we should strive. It is, Dewey 
says, the “democratic ideal.”  It is significant to see why he thinks these two traits are so 
important. The first of them, a proliferation of common interests, “signifies not only more 
numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon 
the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control.” The second, expanding 
interaction among groups, communities, societies and, we should add, nations, “means 
not only freer interaction between social groups…but change in social habit – its 
continuous readjustment  through meeting the new situations produced by varied 
intercourse.”2 
 The two traits that define for Dewey the democratic ideal are also the two 
principles that we shall develop to describe desirable social and international relations. 
The same principles also express the sense in which pragmatism, or Dewey’s naturalistic 
pragmatism at any rate, cuts across the liberalism and communitarianism dichotomy. In 
so far as the human individual is in fundamental respects a social creature, a fact 
indicated if nothing else by the centrality of language to human experience, then the 
liberal conception of the person is to that extent suspicious. At the same time, one avoids 
the pitfalls of a potential communitarian overemphasis on a single community, which in 
practice is one’s own community, by an emphasis on the importance of shared interests 
across community and social boundaries. It is in fact the combination of the two 
principles, which is to say an emphasis on shared interests across boundaries, that 
provides both the pragmatist alternative to liberalism and communitarianism, and at the 
same time the basic principle on which to develop social and international relations. 
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The Domestic Dimension 
 
One can fairly say that not long ago the great international divide among peoples was 
ideological. The primary split was between those who ascribed to some form of socialist 
principles and those who ascribed to some form of liberalism. The strength of those 
ideological disputes has dissipated in recent years, even if the source of them, the 
socialist and liberal ideologies, have not. A longer standing source of division has been 
religion. Though religious wars are for the most part not nearly as vicious as they once 
were, religion remains a point of contestation among peoples, as well as a point of great 
sensitivity. Pope Benedict’s recent quotation from a 14th century Byzantine emperor 
about the violence that attended the early spread of Islam is a case in point, as is the 
consequent strong reaction to his remarks in the Muslim world. 
 Though ideology and religion remain a problem from the point of view of the 
value of human understanding and cooperation, it may well be the case that today even 
stronger causes of social disunity are nationalism and ethnocentrism. It is not difficult to 
list examples of both. The problems in the former Yugoslavia had and continue to have 
these causes, as do many of the tensions throughout Europe. The genocidal wars in 
Rwanda and Sudan are examples, as are many of the tensions today in Russia. Romania 
is no stranger to ethnic and national tensions, especially in Transylvania as people of 
Hungarian and Romanian ethnicities deal with the residue of their respective histories. 
Throughout Central and Eastern Europe societies deal with the vexing question of the 
relation between the majority populations and the Roma. And in the US today the most 
pressing social problem has to do with the strong reaction by many people, including 
local and national leaders, to Mexican immigration. By most counts, there are now 
between 11 and 12 million people of Mexican descent in the US, and those who are 
concerned about this suspect that one consequence of this massive immigration is that 
whole regions of the country will become increasingly Latino and less Anglo, thus 
changing the country in significant ways. Most of our societies, in other words, are 
struggling with the disuniting effects of nationalism and ethnocentrism. 
 Nationalists and ethnocentrists themselves see the problem as one of disunity, 
though from their point of view the problem is caused by the very existence of diverse 
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nations and ethnicities. If that is the case, then the solution is to separate nations and 
ethnicities from one another, or in more extreme cases to eliminate one or the other. 
Leaving aside the point that the consequences of such activities have been and will 
continue to be disastrous even when not deadly, the fundamental problem with the 
nationalist and ethnocentric approach is that it serves to separate people, which in turn 
impoverishes the experience of all involved. Such a situation can never stand as an 
adequate social condition. We can organize democratic political systems as carefully as 
possible, but they will amount to very little if our societies continue to be plagued by 
disharmony based on national and ethnic variety. 
 Thus, following Dewey, the “democratic ideal” pushes us in precisely the 
opposite direction. Notice, however, that the pragmatist, democratic response is not, as 
some traditional approaches have advocated, to work to absorb minority ethnic, racial and 
national groups into the identity of the majority. This approach has been common in 
American history, in part because American history is replete with waves of immigration 
– first from Northern Europe, then from China, then from Southern and Eastern Europe, 
more recently from throughout South and East Asia, and now from Mexico and 
elsewhere in Latin America. There is a strong tradition in the US of attempts to 
“Americanize” immigrant populations, to absorb them into the mainstream, dominant 
culture. 
 The principle we have articulated as central to a healthy, democratic society, 
however, holds that we are to look for, and when necessary create, common interests 
among groups and communities within a society. The democratic response to the 
existence of diverse national, ethnic, racial and religious groups is not separation, 
absorption, or even tolerance. The democratic response is to interact with one another in 
the pursuit of shared, common interests. 
 This is, to be sure, easier said than done. Dewey understood that it requires very 
careful attention to education, primarily because we are suggesting that a healthy, 
democratic society requires different habits from those that are now common in all our 
societies. These habits do not develop automatically, nor of course do they come into 
being simply because some number of social philosophers point to their necessity. They 
will not come into being automatically even if a majority of leaders and policy makers 
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come to see their necessity. The habits of mind and the inclinations necessary for people 
to pursue common interests rather than disharmony and disunity must be developed in 
people from an early age. 
A reliance on education to advance social ends is nothing new. We need only to 
remind ourselves that identity with the nation, i.e. nationalism, was itself something that 
had to be purposefully instilled in our populations. For most of us the nation state with 
which we identify is not more than a couple hundred years old. In all our cases it required 
something of a struggle before the population as a whole began to think of itself in 
national, rather than local, racial, ethnic or religious terms. In the US, for example, before 
the Civil War in the mid-19th century people tended to identify with their state before the 
nation. That is why when some states seceded from the nation in 1861, many people who 
were at the time serving in positions of political and military leadership of the nation 
resigned their positions and joined with the forces of the newly established Confederacy. 
Robert E. Lee, for example, who became the Commander of the Confederate military 
forces during the war, had been an officer in the Army of the United States before his 
native state of Virginia seceded from the Union. When Virginia left the Union so did Lee, 
and the reason was that he was a Virginian before he was an American. 
All of us have analogous histories, and in all our cases a sense of national 
identification had to be developed and the schools were one of the places in which that 
occurred. The military was another. If we have been able to utilize education and other 
national institutions to develop nationalist inclinations and habits, it is not unreasonable 
to look to the same institutions now to do the same in the interests of the habits and 
inclinations we have identified as central to a healthy, democratic society. 
The analogy with the development of nationalism is apt in another way as well. If 
we are right that our current social problems require something like Dewey’s principle of 
the pursuit of common interests among groups and communities, then one of the 
implications is that nationalism has outlived its usefulness. And I mean this is both senses 
of the word “nation,” i.e. as an ethnic identifier and as the nation state. Many of our 
nations, in the latter sense, are multi-national in the former sense. While national identity 
in the former sense is understandable and even valuable, we have been arguing that the 
current needs of our societies are such that we must look beyond nations and ethnicities, 
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and we must use available social institutions to make that possible. We can turn now to 
the implications of the democratic ideal for nationalism in the second sense. 
 
The International Dimension 
 
The modern nation state was created in the mid-17th century in the aftermath of the 30 
Years war in central Europe. The agreement that ended that war, the Treaty of 
Westphalia, is generally regarded as the historical point at which the nation state as we 
know it came into existence. At roughly the same time Thomas Hobbes and others were 
articulating the metaphors and conceptual categories that would frame our conception of 
the state, and inter-state relations, for the next several hundred years. As we all know, 
Hobbes described the state as the sphere of legal authority of a given ruler. In the absence 
of such legal authority, people are in a state of nature, which he famously described as a 
condition in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” In this general picture, 
a state of nature exists in two general conditions: in a given land where there is no state 
authority, and in the “space” between spheres of legal authority, which is to say in the 
space between nations. 
 This picture, this metaphor, has framed our conception of the nation state and our 
understanding of international relations. The point at which nations interact is a state of 
nature which, we may assume, is rather like a land without proper state authority, which 
is to say that it too is nasty and brutish. To this sense of the realm in which nations 
interact we should add a second metaphor, one common to the Baroque period in general. 
In this metaphor, any and all phenomena are understood as ultimately atomistic, as 
constituted by discrete entities that interact with one another according to describable 
“laws.” This is the picture Newtonian science gave to the physical world, it is the picture 
Locke gave to the social and political world, and it is the picture Adam Smith gave to the 
economic world. To see just how pervasive this Baroque metaphor was one can simply 
note that the same picture described even music of the period. Baroque music is basically 
contrapuntal, which is to say that it is characterized by discrete entities, in this case 
melodic lines, which interact or harmonize with one another according to explicitly 
articulated laws or rules of counterpoint. Similarly, physical laws describe how the 
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atomic elements of the physical universe interact harmoniously, social law makes 
possible the harmonic interaction of atomistically understood human individuals, and the 
laws of economics, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” describe the harmonious interaction 
of economic actors. Common to all of these expressions of the Baroque picture of the 
world is the assumption that the ultimate entities in any given sphere are essentially 
unrelated to one another. Each material atom, each human individual, each economic 
actor, and each melodic line, has its nature, its character, its traits, independently of the 
others. 
The same set of assumptions has been taken for granted in the area of 
international relations. Thus three central concepts have been used to frame our 
understanding of how nation states interact with one another: 1) the sphere of their 
interaction is a lawless state of nature; 2) nations are discrete entities that interact with 
one another harmoniously or chaotically, as the case may be, rather like billiard balls 
bouncing off one another; and 3) each discrete entity, each nation state, has its character 
independently of the others, or more to the point, has its own set of interests that are 
determined independently of one another. Given these three basic assumptions, 
international relations has been understood as the exercise in which each nation seeks to 
meet its “national interests” in competition with all the others. Each nation’s foreign 
policy is therefore the framework or set of policies developed for and applied in the 
pursuit of national interest. 
The dominant theoretical approaches to international relations have also tended to 
make these assumptions. Realism is an overtly Hobbesian theory of international 
relations, in which it is assumed that each nation crafts its own set of interests and then 
competes with all other nations in a basically lawless environment to fulfill those 
interests. Liberalism in international relations theory plays the role of Locke to realism’s 
Hobbes, which is to say that for liberalism the general picture is rather kinder and gentler, 
but still one in which each nation defines its interests independently of the others and 
pursues them as best it can. Currently in American foreign policy neoconservative theory 
has come to the fore. It differs from the others in that it is less trustful of international 
agencies and agreements and more inclined to use power, hard and soft, to force nations 
to bend to the will of the powerful. But underneath such differences, neoconservatism 
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makes the same Baroque assumptions about nation states, national interests and 
international relations as do the others. 
None of the prevailing theories of international relations, or applied programs of 
foreign policy, is consistent with what following Dewey we have called the democratic 
ideal, the basic principle of a healthy, democratic society. We have argued that the 
pursuit or development of common interests among diverse national, ethnic and religious 
groups is a necessary condition of a strong democratic society. We have also suggested 
that the pursuit or development of common interests is equally important, even critically 
necessary, across the boundaries of nation states. Given the prevailing approaches to 
international relations theory and foreign policy, however, this is a somewhat radical 
proposal, or so it appears. To pursue it further we should look first at its theoretical 
background in the pragmatist tradition, and then to some current thinking in international 
relations circles. 
In the same chapter of Democracy and Education in which we saw Dewey 
develop his definition of democracy and the “democratic ideal,” he also considers the 
international context. His general concern at this point is with education, so he places his 
remarks in that context: 
Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state and yet 
the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained, and 
corrupted?...Externally, the question is concerned with the reconciliation of 
national loyalty, or patriotism, with superior devotion to the things which unite 
men in common ends, irrespective of national political boundaries.3
This is of course a rhetorical question for Dewey in that he asks it in order to give an 
affirmative answer. The important point for our purposes is that he makes it clear that the 
democratic ideal makes common interests more important than national loyalty and, by 
implication, independently determined national interests. Whatever value national loyalty 
and patriotism may have, the democratic ideal requires “superior devotion” to common 
interests across national boundaries. 
 If this is the case, then the traditional theories of international relations and 
approaches to foreign policy are no longer adequate, at least not if we wish to pursue a 
genuinely democratic international environment. On the contrary, the democratic ideal 
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requires that nation states pursue, and when necessary construct, common interests, and 
that they coordinate their foreign policies to bring those common interests to fruition. In 
order to make this conceptual and policy shift it is necessary for nations first to give up 
the traditional, Baroque metaphor according to which each nation is an independent 
entity that defines itself without recourse to the nature and interests of others, and second 
to overcome the traditional assumption of national sovereignty that has been with us 
since the 17th century. 
 Is this as radical a suggestion as it sounds? First, we should note that the 
traditional Baroque assumptions about the nation state and the international arena are not 
the only possible assumptions. We have too readily mistaken a metaphor for the reality in 
the sense that we have allowed the metaphor to serve as the only possible description of 
reality. But, as one might expect from a pragmatist approach, it is important for us to 
realize that we live in a world that is in many important respects of our own making. In 
the 17th century we made the Hobbesian, Baroque world. In the 21st century it is time for 
us to make a different one. 
Second, even some influential and very mainstream figures in international 
relations have quite independently come to the conclusion that the traditional 
assumptions of the preeminence of national sovereignty are too dangerous in the 
contemporary world to prevail, and that only international collaboration will bring us 
back from the brink we currently see before us. One such figure is Francis Fukuyama, a 
onetime champion of neoconservative foreign policy in the US. Though he does not go as 
far as we do in that he does not yet recognize the need to determine collaboratively the 
very interests that drive foreign policy, he does realize that nations, including and perhaps 
especially the most powerful, must be willing to sacrifice some degree of sovereignty in 
an effort to address the most pressing international problems.4
And third, the fact is that in some places in the world, Europe in particular, the 
effort to recast international relations is already in process. The European Union, 
whatever its flaws and difficulties, is I would submit an example of a process in which 
nations have sacrificed some degree of sovereignty in the construction and pursuit of 
common interests and the resolution of common problems. The Deweyan process, in 
other words, is not only possible, but already underway. 
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Conclusion 
 
To summarize, our argument has led us to the following claims: 
1) Two traits of societies or communities, that they are characterized by interests 
held in common and that they invariably have dealings with other societies or 
communities, define the democratic ideal. That ideal, to put it succinctly, is that a 
healthy, democratic situation requires the identification, construction and pursuit 
of common interests; 
2) In a domestic context, the application of the democratic ideal means that a healthy 
democracy is one in which the interests among the members of various groups or 
communities – racial, ethnic, national, religious – are less important than the 
interests that those groups and communities have in common with one another. 
National policy must make an effort to encourage people to develop the habits of 
mind necessary to search for and where necessary construct such common 
interests; 
3) In the international context, the application of the democratic ideal means that 
nation states must give up the traditional assumptions about distinct spheres of 
national interest, and recast foreign policy to identify and where necessary 
construct common interests among nations. This shift in emphasis requires the 
sacrifice of some amount of national sovereignty, but it offers the only current 
path to the resolution of our most serious international problems. 
In so far as these claims are reasonable and defensible, they offer, as we suggested 
earlier, an alternative, and a distinctly pragmatist alternative, to the prevalent liberal and 
communitarian approaches to social and political theory. They avoid the inappropriately 
abstract character of the liberal understanding of the individual, and they avoid the 
undesirable overemphasis on the importance of one’s own community. In their place the 
principle we have developed points to a kind of cosmopolitanism in which the richness 
and variety of individuals and communities flourishes only in so far as they interact with 
one another toward common ends. In practice, this pragmatist principle, the democratic 
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ideal, offers us a way, I would argue the necessary way, to address our most pressing 
domestic and international problems. 
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